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Introduction
In recent years, the remarkable growth of both China and India has attracted increasing attention from academics as well as policymakers. Measured by the market exchange rates, the gross domestic product (GDP) of China reached US$5.0 trillion in 2009, while the GDP of India was estimated to be US$1.2 trillion in the same year.
1 As these two Asian economic giants grow, their inward foreign direct investment has also increased substantially.
But a more interesting trend has caught the attention of academics in the last few India, there was only a modest rise in the index between the two periods, while for China, the index actually declines. What that may imply is that while the absolute amount of FDI outflows from these large Asian countries have gone up significantly, the values of their GDP have gone up so much more rapidly that the performance indices have actually increased only mildly or actually declined. Furthermore, the performance indices of these two economies remain substantially below one, with India being 0.04 and China 0.09.
2
If we use the performance indices as rough indications of the future trends of the outflows from these economies, then we should expect that with regards to the future outward FDI from these economies, more will be expected to flow from China and India. 3 The future quantitative and qualitative impact of FDI outflows on other economies will likely to be increasingly high.
In this paper, we will conduct empirical studies of the determinants of Indian and sis.
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The second yet of factors concern the characteristics of the host economies.
There host economies' features include the quality of the institutions, openness and capital controls of the host countries. Recent literature on FDI and economic growth h paid particular attention to the effects of institutional factors (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson 2001 , Wei 2000 , Fung, Garcia-Herrero, Iizaka and Siu 2005 . In our a pay particular attention to our indices of corruption and law and order.
The last set of factors concern the macroeconomic characteristics of the Ch Buckley et.al. (2007) , and Cheung and Qian (2009) . We provide several contributions in this paper.
First, our paper is the first that we are aware of to contrast and compare the various determinants of FDI outflows from the two large emerging countries in Asia-India and
China. In particular, we show that Chinese investment tends to go to more corrupt economies, while Indian investment is higher in economies with a better system of law and order.
5
Second, our paper systematically tests the various hypotheses associated with China-and India-specific needs at this stage of their economic development. Lastly, in addition to institutional factors, we are also able to estimate the importance of various host countries' characteristics within the pattern of Indian and Chinese investment abroad.
In the next section, we will discuss our basic econometric exercises. In section 3, we present our results and our interpretations. In section 4, we conclude.
Empirical Methodology
The basic methodology is to first estimate the Chinese and Indian FDI outflows to various economies by the standard gravity model. While there is very little literature addressing the theoretical foundation of this model in assessing FDI, there is an emerging attempt to provide a theoretical model linking the gravity model to FDI flows (see e.g. Regressions are run with weighted least squares. Sources of the data are listed in the appendix. Tables 1 and Table 2 show the regression results for China and India, respectively. Share of electrical machinery in total exports Log of India GDP00
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Empirical Results
Note: ***, **, and * denotes significance level at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. There is only limited evidence that India and China invest to acquire technology.
But the technology acquisition hypothesis holds true for China only for the IT expenditure but not for the R&D expenditure. In fact, the R&D expenditure has the wrong sign for China. For India, both proxies are insignificant.
For the home market macroeconomic variables, China's FDI outflows are positively related to its GDP and its bilateral exchange rate with the destination countries.
Contrary to conventional results, a decline in the value of the yuan induces an increase of Chinese FDI outflows. However, the magnitude of the yuan exchange rate variable is very small. For the India case, a rise of the bilateral rupee exchange rate raises FDI outflows but the domestic GDP is insignificant. As for the other characteristics of the host countries, the total trade indicators are not significant for either the Chinese or Indian regressions. However, the openness index in the form of FTA is positive and significant for both India and China. Capital controls on FDI are negatively and significantly related to Indian outflows but insignificant for Chinese outflows.
We next turn to the core gravity variables. After controlling for other determinants, both FDI outflows increase in destination economies which share common borders with India and China. But the similarities end with the border dummy. China is generally seen to invest in larger but poorer economies (larger GDP and smaller GDP per capita). It is also investing in destinations that are closer to home. In contrast, India is generally investing in economies that are smaller and richer (smaller GDP and larger GDP per capita). It is investing further away from home. Part of these differences reflects the fact that China has significant investment in Asia as well as in large developing countries in Latin America and in Africa. Some of these countries have large population but low purchasing power. Compared with China, India has more investment in richer countries that are further away.
A much more striking contrast between the Indian and the Chinese cases is the differences between the institutional features of their host economies. Note that a higher value of the corruption index corresponds to less corrupt economies, while a higher value of the law and order index refers to economies with better rule of law and more stable societies. From Table 1 , we see that Chinese outward investment is higher in more corrupt economies, but the index of law and order is insignificant. India seems to be following the expected pattern of FDI from other economies and invest more in countries which are less corrupt and with a better law and order index.
One interpretation of our result on FDI outflows and institutional quality is that Chinese FDI abroad is mostly dominated by state-owned enterprises. In 2006, more than 86% of Chinese FDI flowing abroad was accounted for by state-owned enterprises.
There are at least two characteristics that differentiate the state-owned enterprises from their private counterparts. First, the state-owned firms may be implicitly insured by the Chinese government, or at least their managers may perceive that they are so insured.
There are no binding, hard budget constraints and their losses from taking excessive risks can be written off with limited bankruptcy implications. If this is the case, the Chinese outward FDI can take risks that are not necessarily market-based. They can afford to invest more in more corrupt economies. In contrast, the Indian FDI outflows are mostly done by private Indian multinationals. They may tend to asses their host economies like profit maximizing firms in other countries. They tend to invest in less corrupt countries with a better system or law and order. Note that this interpretation assumes that the state-owned firms are still maximizing profits, except that they are operating under a different set of financial constraints. In the case of India, since the firms are privatelyowned and their losses will bite, deviating from profit maximization will be much more costly.
Another interpretation with this contrasting result may be related to potential foreign policy considerations indirectly carried out by the state-owned firms on behalf of the government. Such FDI may be an investment to buy goodwill and can be seen as a disguised form of Chinese foreign aid. 6 The state-owned firms invest in a variety of projects (including infrastructure projects) that generate good will in these developing economies. These economies may have poor governance indicators, but since the objective of the investment is not purely to maximize profits, they will still invest more.
This interpretation assumes that the state-owned firms are not maximizing profits, or at least they are not maximizing profits alone. Their objectives may be a weighted sum of profits and foreign policy considerations. The fact that these enterprises can do such investment is partly due to their budget constraints not being totally binding. So this interpretation is not entirely independent of the previously discussed interpretation.
Our regression results for China may be partly tied to the investment in African While it is difficult to judge the impact of such investment-cum-foreign policy, existing empirical studies tend to highlight the importance of Chinese investment in narrowing the infrastructure deficits that poor Africa nations are facing.
Conclusion
In recent years, we have witnessed a surge of FDI outflows from India and China.
Where are the motives of such FDI outflows? What are the characteristics of these destination countries? In this paper, we examine the determinants of Indian and Chinese outward FDI. We use an augmented gravity model and test several hypotheses concerning India and Chinese outflows. The core gravity model includes GDP of the host economies, GDP per capita, distance and a dummy indicating sharing of a common border.
In terms of motives, we test if the outward FDI is natural resource-seeking (seeking fuel, food or metals) and technology-seeking. We also estimate the importance of some of the host countries' characteristics, including their degrees of openness, their restrictions on FDI, their degree of corruption and their indices of law and order. We further examine some of the home country's macroeconomic variables: Indian and Chinese GDPs and the bilateral exchange rates.
There are three sets of results. First, Chinese investment seems to be attracted to more corrupt countries, while India is attracted to less corrupt economies with better rule of law. Our analysis and interpretations suggests that our result of China investing in more corrupt destinations may be tied to Chinese investment in African countries. The result may also be tied to investment being conducted by state-owned firms. Chinese companies are building hydroelectric power stations, roads, bridges and other forms of infrastructure, often in exchange for oil from some African countries with poor governance indicators (e.g. Sudan). It is not the point of this paper to evaluate the welfare impact of such investment-cum-foreign policy in sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere. But according to several studies in the literature (World Bank 2008a , 2008b , Broadman 2007 , as a by-product of China's quest for oil in Africa, China is also providing concessional financing to Africa, help increase African exports to Asia as well as contributing to narrowing the infrastructure deficits of the sub-Saharan African economies.
Second, Chinese FDI is going to economies with larger GDP but smaller GDP per capita. China seems to be investing in economies that are closer to home. This may be because China has been investing, among other countries, in developing countries (including those in Asia) with large population. For India, FDI is going to smaller but richer host countries. But India seems to be investing in destinations that are far away.
Lastly, both India and China seem to be investing in economies to seek fuels. There is not much evidence that they are investing to acquire technology. A lower value of the yuan and a higher value of the rupee relative to the value of the currencies of the host countries seem to increase Indian and Chinese investment abroad.
This paper provided some interesting results concerning the contrasts of India and Chinese FDI outflows. However, given that this issue is still a relatively new topic of research, we believe that more work is needed to generate robust empirical conclusions.
